The paper investigates the factors that have influenced WTO members to take on level of liberalization commitments in the framework of liberalization of trade in financial services and the impact of such commitments on financial sector stability. The most important factors are economic growth, current account, trends in banking sector development, policy restrictiveness, and peer group effects. The econometric evidence suggests that more liberal commitments may be associated with greater vulnerability to currency and banking crisesmost likely a short-term effect. They should/will be mitigated with time through increased market efficiency and better resource allocation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many countries, especially in Asia and Latin America, have been hit by financial crises, in the form of banking problems or exchange rate instability. Research to date has suggested a number of explanations for these crises: unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, unsustainable or inconsistent monetary, fiscal or industrial policy, unsound banking practices or weak supervision, short-term capital flows, speculation and contagion: see Dornbush (2001) and IMF (1999 IMF ( , 2000 for recent surveys. At the same time, there has been a secular trend toward capital account liberalization and capital account convertibility (IMF, 1998) , and extensive negotiations to liberalize trade in financial services have taken place (see Box 1). A major achievement in the latter respect has been the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the aegis of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In contrast to the extensive work on capital account liberalization, the question of whether the level of financial services commitments under GATS has had any influence on the occurrence of financial sector instability or exchange rate crises, has received little systematic attention. Given the importance of the financial sector to promote economic growth and its special role to intermediate between savings and investments, it is important to know the answer to this question. Of related interest is another neglected issue, namely the question of what determines a country's level of commitments in financial services. It would be interesting to identify the variables, be they economic variables such as GDP per capita or inflation, legal or other. Both issues are examined in this paper, in addition to a comprehensive computation of the financial services commitments.
To anticipate the findings, the evidence presented here suggests that the level of commitments can be explained reasonably well by a set of macroeconomic, banking, policy and institutional variables. Furthermore, it appears that financial instability, in particular during the turbulent 1997-1999, was larger in more open countries with higher and more liberal financial sector commitments. Using a robust estimation procedure, the econometric evidence weakly supports this view. Probably reflecting foreign contagion effects, more liberal commitments on commercial presence have systematically increased the likelihood of banking crises prompted by external factors. Countries that have more restrictive banking services commitments, reflecting a more closed and insulated financial systems, have systematically lower chances of getting into a banking crisis proliferated from abroad. The evidence also suggests that a better resource allocation framework created by a more liberal financial system should be safeguarded, in particular in the short-run, against possible negative spillovers and international crises contagion by means of sound domestic macroeconomic and prudential policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the benefits and theoretical effects of commitments and develops empirical measures. Section III investigates the determinants of the level of commitments in financial services. Section IV is devoted to testing the impact of these commitments on financial (in)stability. Section V concludes and offers a few practical lessons.
Box 1. The history of Financial Services Agreements -modes of supply

History
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was concluded in December 1993, and formally signed in Marrakech, in April 1994. One outcome was the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to monitor all the existing trade agreements and facilitate future negotiations. It succeeded the GATT structure (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). With respect to financial services, as part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Uruguay Round Agreement contained schedules of individual countries' commitments on market access and national treatment conditions. At the end of the Uruguay Round, negotiations on financial services remained unfinished since specific commitments were deemed insufficient and too many countries retained exemptions to the most-favored-nation principle. Extended negotiations resulted in the Second Protocol to the GATS -the so-called Interim Agreement-adopted July 21, 1995, which entered into force September 1, 1996.
Further negotiations resulted in the Fifth Protocol on Financial Services, adopted December 12, 1997, which entered into force March 1, 1999. Negotiations on services (including financial services) formally resumed January 1, 2000,. Yet to date, only few members have made new proposals to further liberalize trade in financial services.
Modes of supply
Trade in services in general can take on four different forms (modes of supply). The two most important forms are the cross-border supply (mode 1), which acts like traditional international trade flows, and commercial presence (mode 3), which involves foreign direct investment. In addition, there is consumption abroad (mode 2) when a resident purchases a financial service in the territory of another country, and supply through the presence of natural persons (mode 4), under the form of independent visiting financial consultants or bank staff temporarily allocated to a branch in the territory of another country.
Consequently, service trade negotiations under the GATS not only pertain to international markets (traditional exchanges between residents and nonresidents, cross-border), they also affect the operation of domestic service markets (through the arrangements under mode 3). As such, the impact of services trade liberalization agreements is more profound than that of goods markets. See Kireyev (2002) for a more detailed exposition and for links between financial services commitments, capital account transactions and prudential regulations.
The official classification of financial services is contained in the Annex on Financial Services. A similar (but not identical) sector classification distinguishes between banking, insurance, and other financial services. The latter makes a cross-reference to the UN Central Product Classification (CPC).
Regarding the level of commitments, countries may choose between full binding (specified as 'none' in GATS documents, i.e., absent any limitations), limited bindings (limitations on the coverage or in the form of a restrictive measure) or no binding (called 'unbound' against the relevant mode of supply). For a more detailed overview, see Kono et al. (1997) , WTO (1998) and Sapir (1999) .
II. FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION COMMITMENTS
A. Why Commitments? Theoretical Considerations
This section discusses the role and benefits of trade liberalization and specific financial services liberalization commitments. Some preliminary thoughts are given towards the development of a conceptual framework that relates financial liberalization commitments to the risk of a financial crisis. However, the main part of the paper is devoted to quantify and refine empirical regularities as a guide to future theoretical modeling.
First, trade liberalization in (financial) services can be beneficial, since it not only stimulates trade in (financial) services itself, but it can also facilitate trade in goods, through the inputs from (financial) services industries required. Conversely, trade liberalization -through a reduction of regulations governing the international provision of services-can stimulate industry fragmentation and hence increase trade. As argued by Deardorff (2000) , separating production processes across locations (i.e., fragmentation) requires additional service inputs (transportation, insurance, finance, etc.), a trend that is facilitated when the services market is open to international competition. Furthermore, there is ample empirical evidence documenting the positive effects of deregulation, as a particular form of liberalization, on macroeconomic performance. 1 Second, financial services commitments constitute legally binding engagements under WTO rules, and therefore contribute to the creation of stable, transparent and minimally enforceable policies. In addition, these commitments can be seen as a way of signaling a country's seriousness to potential foreign investors (Tamirisa et al., 2000) . In this respect, Claessens and Laeven (2002) find that in a weaker legal environment a firm will get less external financing, and thus invest less, and also invest less in intangible assets, which negatively affects the growth in value added.
At the theoretical level, there are sound arguments why commitments can be considered as positive for financial and economic growth and stability. Kydland and Prescott (1977) find that clearly established and time-consistent rules allow economic agents to benefit from greater stability, certainty and transparency in their decision making. In absence of clear rules (i.e., under discretion), an economy may suffer from greater uncertainty (possibly due to credibility problems) and, as such, may be more vulnerable to financial crises.
2
In this 1 Among others, Koedijk and Kremers (1996) find that in Europe a more liberal product market regulation positively affected per capita growth, labor and total factor productivity growth. Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe (1999) find that a higher degree of economic freedom raises growth, for a sample of 115 countries. de Haan and Sturm (2000) note that it is changes in economic freedom, not the absolute level, that matters. Goff (1996) for the United States finds that a higher regulatory intensity reduces growth. Dutz and Hayri (1998) find that a pro-competitive policy environment fosters higher per capita growth. 2 The conclusions may change to some extent, according to the specific elements that cause uncertainty and instability in a given economic setup.
context, clear commitments in financial services can be seen as a device to communicate a country's adherence to a credible rules-based financial sector regime. Dixit (1992) shows that commitments can also be incorporated into economic models more directly, from an investment under uncertainty perspective: a higher level of commitments directly reduces aggregate uncertainty, which is beneficial for investments that otherwise would be delayed until the uncertainty is resolved. With respect to financial sector commitments, a low level of commitments would leave international financial service providers with a great deal of uncertainty, e.g., about the scope of permitted activities, market access restrictions, different national treatment, exposure to political regime shifts, etc. Therefore, international financial service providers may wait to increase their participation in a country until aggregate uncertainty is reduced through clear and high levels of commitments. The liberalization and market opening may have benefits in the form of extended diversification and global (re)insurance possibilities for economic agents obtaining access to a larger pool of international liquidities and obtaining lower and more stable prices of financial products and services. However, risks may also increase since the operations of these institutions are more difficult to regulate and supervise, and enterprise risks may become more complex to manage. To give greater credence to this mechanism, it is instructive to see that participation of international financial institutions has increased in high-commitment countries, but not or less so in low-commitment countries and that the international participation increases in line with the level of commitments (quantification of the commitments itself will be discussed below). In Figure 1 , the change in financial sector openness (proxied by the value of financial services exports and imports as a percent of GDP) is depicted for low and high-commitment countries, over the period 1995-1999 versus 1990-1994 ; as can be seen, the increase is pronounced in high-commitments countries, but less so in low-commitments countries. Figure 2 compares the level of financial services openness; it shows that, in general, higher commitments are associated with greater financial services openness.
Another effect of financial services commitments may come through the level of protectionism and inefficiency in the domestic financial service sectors. If a country agrees adopt high standards of liberalization commitments, this may result in serious problems for the local financial service providers which are in a weaker position than their, presumably, more efficient international competitors. Vice versa, it could well be the case that political economy arguments favor less liberalization commitments for countries with a relatively weak domestic banking sector. Low and high-commitments countries were identified as their commitments measures were below or above the median value, respectively. Financial sector commitments are presented for banking, insurance, securities and support services. General refers to the average of the four sectors. Financial services openness is measured by imports and exports of financial services and insurance payments as a percent of GDP. The changes compare the period average for 1995-1999 and 1990-1994 
B. Financial Sector Commitments Quantification Literature Overview and Assessment
A few studies have quantified countries' financial sector commitments, including Kono and Schuknecht (2000) and Mattoo (2000) . 4 Kono and Schuknecht construct measures of modal bias (indicating whether mode 3 commitments are higher than mode 1's), lending bias (determining whether lending activity is more liberalized than securities) and restrictiveness for foreign establishments in 27 developing countries under the Uruguay Round schedules of 1993. Mattoo (2000) constructs commitment indices for the Second Protocol using a specific weighting scheme, taking into account the importance of modes (based on U.S. data) and scores (between 0 and 1) for the respective commitments for 105 countries' market access commitments in banking (deposits and lending) and direct insurance (life and non-life).
The methodology of Mattoo gives good indications of financial sector commitments, both for individual countries and for country blocks. However, for the purpose of this study, it may be useful to consider a broader range of financial services (see Table 2 ), viz. money market broking and trading, reinsurance and insurance intermediation, securities trading and underwriting services, asset management, and payment and settlement services, and information exchange, all of which might affect financial stability. Moreover, the simple scaling (assigning values between 0 and 1, depending on the type of restrictions) can be expanded and a principal component analysis (PCA) may be used to determine the importance of modes and financial services sector commitments more objectively, instead of a predetermined weighting scheme as in Mattoo, who applies the modal weights of the U.S. service sectors to the rest of the world (because the United States is the only country where this statistical information is available). 5 4 Among the first assessments, Hoekman (1996) , and Hoekman and Primo Braga (1996) compiled overall and sectoral indices of commitments for all GATS members (situation as of April 1994). They use values of 0, 0.5 and 1 for 'unbound', 'bound' and 'none', respectively, relative to the maximum number of sectors listed in GATS. Similarly, Kono et al. (1997) give summary tables of GATS commitments for four country groupings (developed, transition, developing, and least developed countries), for 1993 -1995 . Sorsa (1997 contains an annex of selected countries' market access commitments in banking, securities and other financial service sectors, differentiated by mode of supply and by conditionality for the situation as of July 1995. WTO (1998) contains a summary list indicating whether countries have commitments in financial services, as of December 1998. 5 Factor analysis or PCA is appealing since it allows for a weighting of each indicator and mode according to its contribution to the overall variance in the data and it ensures that a large part of the cross-country variances is explained by a small set of summary measures. For example, Nicoletti (2001) uses factor analysis to classify OECD countries with respect to their state of services regulation (telecom, transport, electricity supply services) along a cardinal scale from least to most restrictive.
Empirical Measures of Financial Sector Commitments
In line with Mattoo (2000) , WTO financial sector commitments measures are constructed from the Fifth Protocol (1997) (1998) (1999) for all 92 signatories (the European Union was treated as a single signatory, which is motivated by the existence of a single European passport for banking and insurance service providers; in the subsequent analysis, synthetic EU data are used). In Table 2 , the construction of the commitments is explained in more detail. The proposed measure differs in a few respects from Mattoo: when a country explicitly states it is 'unbound' against a sector/mode, it is believed that this is slightly better than a blank entry, hence the score 0.05 instead of 0. Limited commitments and reciprocity were given a smaller score since these are in fact very restrictive commitments (both 0.25 instead of 0.50 and 0.75, respectively). Licensing subject to requirements was given a slightly higher score than discretionary licensing, to make a distinction between the two limitations (0.30 and 0.35 instead of 0.25). Besides this simple [0,1] scoring, the data were processed through PCA. In Appendix I and II, commitments scores for the 92 countries and a detailed description of the principal components, respectively, are given. Deposits, lending, money broking, trading Life, non-life, reinsurance, intermediation Issue and underwriting, securities settlement, asset management Provision of financial information, payment and settlement Mattoo (2000) Banking: Insurance:
Deposits, lending Life, non-life
Notes
This Table presents the scores and service sectors for which financial services liberalization commitments were investigated. By way of comparison, the scores and service sectors examined by Mattoo (2000) , are given. *: not mentioned explicitly, presumably a 0.25 score for discretionary licensing is taken. 
The table reports country group average commitments as specified in Table 2 . GDP-weighted averages use 1999 GDP, expressed in SDR. All: global average of all 13 sector commitments, Ins: insurance commitments (direct life and non-life, reinsurance, intermediation), Bank: banking commitments (deposits and lending, money broking, trading), Sec: securities commitments (underwriting, settlement, asset management), Sup: support services commitments (supply of financial information, payment and settlement systems). Source: author's calculations. 
The table reports regional averages of the first three principal components and sector averages of financial services commitments specified in Table 2 and Appendix I. GDP-weighted averages use 1999 GDP, expressed in SDR. Source: author's calculations. Tables 3 and 4 give an overview of the commitments according to region and income groups, for the 0-1 scores and the PCA, respectively. The upper panels report unweighted averages while the lower panels present GDP-weighted averages. As can be seen, there are no major differences between the two schemes, although for Latin America-Caribbean region, and Eastern Europe-Central Asia, typically, smaller countries have slightly more liberal commitments as the unweighted group averages exceed the GDP-weighted averages. As can be seen, there are wide differences between country groups and between different modes of supply. For example, from Table 3 , Western Europe-North America and OECD countries have low overall commitments under mode 1, but very high overall commitments under mode 3 (also under mode 2 for OECD countries). LDCs are typically less open than developed countries (at least in modes 2 and 3). Transition economies have relatively liberal commitments under modes 1 and 2, in line with general economic reforms they undertake to achieve free and open market economies. Comparing commitments across different financial sectors and modes, Table 4 suggests that securities-related services are generally less liberalized than banking and insurance services. Furthermore, mode 1, the most "trade" related mode, is overall less liberalized than modes 2 and 3. As such, there is still some room for further negotiations on the liberalization of financial services.
As mentioned above, another way to assess financial services commitments is by measuring the underlying principal components. Besides revealing the major trends, PCA also allows for a reduction in the number of indicators or dimensions. It has been noted that these WTO commitments may understate the true level of financial services liberalization achieved on the ground, and rather reflect a status quo instead of effective liberalization. A clear example seems to be Western Europe-North America, with zero entries in banking and securities under mode 1, which is less than actual financial services liberalization; see also Dobson and Jacquet (1998) , Chang et al. (1999) . Although being an imperfect measure, the fact that correlations in Table 1 were relatively small, seem to confirm this point (viz., the understatement of the true level of liberalization).
III. WHAT DETERMINES THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENTS?
An important question is whether there are any systematic factors which may have influenced the negotiations and the final agreement on the Fifth Protocol. If there are statistically significant determinants of a country's level of financial services commitments, then, clearly, there are costs and benefits involved in adopting a certain set of commitments, and deviating from the commitments would tend to be very costly. Furthermore, if there are systematic determinants, one can use that structure to gauge the potential for further liberalization efforts.
This issue can be investigated more formally using ordered-choice models. In such models, the dependent variable is an ordered discrete variable whose value represents the countries' level of commitments (categories) from 1 to M. By considering a latent variable that linearly depends on the explanatory variables, the observed ranking is then modeled by assigning the estimates to the respective categories (depending on whether or not a specific, estimated, γ-threshold is exceeded). More formally, a latent variable y i * can be expressed as
where ε are independent and identically distributed random variables, subscript i stands for country i, x i is a set of explanatory variables, and β is the coefficient vector. The mapping from the unobserved y i * to the observed y i commitment level for country i uses the rule
where γ j denotes the threshold level j.
The probability functions that maps commitments onto the M classes are:
] is the probability that country i will choose commitment level j, j = 0,…, M; Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function in the case of a multinomial probit model, and other variables are defined above. The multinomial probit model maximizes the following log likelihood function, with respect to β and γ:
with M the number of choices and N the number of countries, j denoting the liberalization commitments level, y i is the level of choice for country i, and 1( .
) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the argument is true. See Greene (1999, pp. 875-879) for an in-depth overview of the technique. To estimate the ordered-choice model, the data of section II are partitioned using the discrete classification measures of the sector averages of the financial services commitments. For the principal components, ordinary least squares (OLS) can be applied since the dependent variable is a continuous variable. In addition to macroeconomic determinants, the significance of institutional and fixed factors, viz., legal origins, economic freedom, political rights, main export category and peer effects (regional and income group effects), is examined. Theoretically, macroeconomic factors may account for the dynamic evolution of liberalization commitments over time and across countries, but political and institutional factors may be needed to control for different historical attitudes towards liberalization agreements. The set of explanatory variables is described in more detail in Appendix III. The classification of countries across the [0,1] interval is given in Table 5 : the largest number of countries are found in the low and medium categories of the table, with commitments scores below 0.20 and 0.60 yielding 40 to 50 and 70 to 90 percent of the cumulative distribution, respectively; accordingly, the high-commitments category (scores above 0.60 or 0.75) counts much smaller number of observations. The insurance commitments scores are a bit different in that the low category (scores below 0.20) accounts for only 30 percent of the observations; see also the distribution for PC3. Tables 6 and 7 report the statistical results, using a partitioning of the average [0,1] scores in 3 categories: low, medium and high level of commitments, obtained from the combination of Table 5 's cells in pairs. Table 8 reports the principal components OLS regression results. The selection of variables follows from a stepwise selection procedure, in which additional variables are included according to the size of the z-statistic, for those significant at the 5 percent level. A positive coefficient for the ordered-choice model means that, ceteris paribus, a higher value of the variable will increase the probability that the country will be placed in a higher category. The full sample consists of 92 countries, but statistical deficiencies prevent the use of the full sample. The maximum feasible sample is 76 to 86 countries, depending on the series retained in the analysis. Because of concerns that the determination may be different in small island economies and least developed countries, the model is also run over a smaller sample of 68 countries made up of all countries with per capita income above $1,000 and population above 1 million for 1997; see Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) , who raised this issue.
The tables show that there are a number of significant factors that explain the level of countries' WTO commitments, for the whole sample and the sample without small countries, respectively. Broadly speaking, the liability position relative to the IMF quota, macroeconomic growth, balance of payments evolution and openness, population growth, banking variables, peer group effects and policy restrictiveness indicators all seem to contribute to the explanation of the level of (some of) the financial services commitments. It is also clear that the composition of the group of statistically significant variables changes with the specific service sector commitments under examination. Statistics are generally satisfactory, as evidenced by an R 2 between 0.25 and 0.60 -which is typical in the context of cross-country regressions-and by the high likelihood ratio statistics. Classification measures suggest that misclassifications are very few. Furthermore, the classification into 3 categories is acceptable, given the statistical significance of the γ-thresholds, except for banking and securities services and PC3, where γ 2 and γ 3 , respectively, are not significant.
The most important findings are as follows. Countries whose liabilities position against the IMF (in percent of the quota) increased over the years 1995-97, have typically enacted higher commitment levels. This effect is largely due to the impact of small countries, since the variable does not appear in Table 7 . Long run (1991-97 or 1991-95) economic growth (of GDP per capita) has a statistically significant and negative effect, suggesting that countries with lower growth in general have higher commitments, in line with the stylized facts from section II: high-income countries have higher commitments but also have lower per capita growth rates. A positive short run growth over 1995-97, however, seems to have stimulated the bigger countries (see Table 7 ) to adopt higher overall levels of financial sector commitments. Table 5 reports ordered choice estimates (β-coefficients and z-scores) of the model in equation (1)- (4), obtained from a stepwise selection procedure. Statistical significance of the z-scores can be inferred from the standard normal distribution: 5% significance is at 1.96 and 1% significance is at 2.58.
Regression statistics are McFadden R 2 = 1-LogL/LogL c with LogL c the maximized log likelihood with only the intercept terms, and a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test = -2(LogL c -LogL), which is χ 2 distributed with K degrees of freedom, K being the number of regressors included. The classification statistics compare actual commitment rankings (Act) with predicted rankings (Pred), where countries' commitments are classified under the category with the largest probability.
Explanatory variables refer to 1997 levels, percentage growth rates (gr.) or changes (ch.), respectively, , and ( . ) 2 denote squared variables. Growth rates and changes are measured over the period 1995-1997, unless otherwise indicated. Variables are expressed as percentages. For a full account of all variables tested in the stepwise selection procedure, the reader is referred to Appendix III. LIAB/QUOTA UP: a dummy variable that equals one if the ratio of a country's liabilities to (IMF) quota has risen, GDPC: growth of GDP per capita, Openness: exports (EXP) plus imports (IMP) of goods and services as a percent of GDP, FDI/GDP: the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP. Banking variables are drawn from IFS deposit money bank (DMB) surveys. EIU 0 banking crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the country faced a crisis in 1995-96 (see section IV and Appendix VI). German and French law: dummies that reflect the origin of the legal system. Dummy for main export category: services. Regional dummies for LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, EAP: East Asia and Pacific, and OECD. Policy/Freedom indicators are drawn from Heritage Foundation and Freedom House, respectively. The variable 6 Financials refers to the (squared) average of six financial policy (restrictiveness) indicators, viz. banking and finance , monetary policy, trade policy, capital flows and foreign investment, property rights, and regulation. GDPC growth is measured over the period 1991-1995 (all sectors and banking services) and 1991-1997 (insurance, securities, support services and PC1). Short-term growth is GDPC growth over 1995-1997. The change in political freedom and asset growth in support services commitments are measured over the period 1993-1997. Countries whose openness of the current account has increased between 1995 and 1997 seem to have been less keen on liberalizing financial services as a whole and banking in particular; this protectionism effect seems to be due to the small countries group since it is only visible in Table 6 .
The better the performance of the banking sector, in terms of increases in the dollar value of assets, deposits, or loans, the more likely countries will adopt higher levels of liberalization commitments. Although the effect is most clearly reflected in Table 6 , it also holds for the banking sector and support services commitments of large countries (suggested by the significance of the asset growth variable in Table 7 ). However, also countries which have been subject to a banking crisis in 1995-96 (EIU 0 definition; see section IV) subsequently have chosen a larger degree of liberalization (see the average category in Table 7 and insurance category in Tables 6 and 7) .
Furthermore, the evidence in Tables 6 and 7 indicates that, as a whole, countries that have a legal system based on German law accepted on average less liberal commitments. Small countries with French-based legal systems assumed more limited commitments in insurance services. There are also clear peer group effects related to geographical region, in line with the descriptive statistics from section II: Latin American and Caribbean countries as a whole have accepted lower levels of commitments, irrespective of their size. The bigger East Asian and Pacific countries seem to have agreed as a group on more liberal commitments (see Table 7 ). After controlling for other factors, the group of OECD countries tends to have less liberal insurance service commitments while the opposite holds for East Asian and Pacific countries (see Table 6 ). The various financial policy indicators suggest that countries whose policies are more restrictive engage significantly less in the liberalization process. In some cases, the effect is exponential rather than linear, suggesting even larger differences between countries with free and restrictive policy regimes, in their choice of liberalization commitments (for the monetary policy effect, see below). This lends some support to the signaling effect of commitments for actual policy choices, as suggested in section II.A.
Finally, there are several minor points that deserve some attention: the evidence in Table 6 suggest that a higher growth rate of exports over imports and an increase in the ratio of foreign direct investments (FDI) to GDP have encouraged countries to implement higher commitments in support services, such as financial information services and payments systems. These factors are relevant for the sample as a whole, while for the large economies, the FDI effect is substituted for by a domestic investment to GDP effect with the opposite sign.
For the larger economies, Table 7 implies that the investment to GDP ratio affects the choice of overall commitments, and securities and support service commitments in particular: the higher the investment ratio, the lower will be the agreed commitments. An increase in foreign direct investments (FDI) relative to GDP had a negative impact on banking but a positive impact on the choice of insurance commitments: countries that became more attractive for FDI have narrow banking services commitments but more liberal insurance commitments. In addition, a larger population and a higher deposit base seem to have had a negative impact on the average level and level of insurance commitments, respectively. Since these variables are likely to capture a size effect signaling service market opportunities, these findings seems to suggest that, in terms of these variables, the large countries have acted as if they tried to prevent foreign competitors from "cherry-picking" of their domestic financial services markets (mode 3), as well as make it difficult for local residents and firms to engage in cross-border services (mode 1 and 2). In contrast, the positive coefficient on GDP in the securities and support equations suggest that positive size effects have played a role in the determination of these services commitments.
The negative effect of inflation on insurance commitments in Table 7 (through a dummy variable that equals one if inflation exceeds 10 percent in 1997) is also noteworthy. This effect should be considered jointly with the positive coefficient of the squared monetary policy indicator from Heritage Foundation, which is in fact an inflation indicator. 8 The combined effect of the inflation dummy and step variable indicates that moderate-inflation countries (between 6 and 12 percent) and very high-inflation countries (above 20 percent) had more positive coefficients than the other countries, which led, ceteris paribus, to an association with relatively more liberal commitments: see Figure 3 , which displays the combined effect of the inflation dummy and step variable. Table 7 .
Finally, the evolution of political rights between 1993 and 1997, according to the Freedom House indicator, seems to have had a positive impact on countries' choice of commitments for securities services (Table 7) and banking ( Table 8 ). The fact that this variable enters as a quadratic term indicates that countries that changed more rapidly have locked in to this political changeover in some of their commitments in a more liberal way.
9 Table 8 contains the OLS results for the determination of the principal components. The results for the overall level of commitments, captured by PC1, are in line with the AVERAGE results reported in Tables 6 and 7 . In particular, PC1 for large countries is explained very well, given the R 2 of 0.67. Countries with a higher GDP and stronger economic growth over 8 The Heritage monetary policy indicator gives a grading of average inflation over 1991-1997 from 1 to 5: 1 if inflation is below 3 percent; 2 if inflation is between 3 and 6 percent; 3 if inflation is between 6 and 12 percent; 4 if inflation is between 12 and 20 percent; and 5 if inflation is higher than 20 percent. 9 The Freedom House indicator is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, from highest to lowest political freedom. From the 36 observed changes in political freedom, only 9 were moves towards the upper side, and only Gambia (+5) and Colombia (+2) moved up by more than 1 unit. On the lower side, it were mainly Latin American and Eastern European countries that introduced small political liberalizations (27 countries moved down 1 unit) and 9 countries moved down by more than 1 unit, viz. South Africa (-4), Malawi (-4), Mozambique (-3), Haiti (-3), Ghana (-2), Estonia (-2), Latvia (-2), Romania (-2), and India (-2). Therefore it is safe to say that it is mainly moves towards more democratic regimes that are associated with liberal commitments in banking and securities services.
1995-97 have assumed higher overall commitments. Countries who had borrowed from IMF during the previous years, have also enacted stronger overall commitments, although this effect is offset by the level of liabilities relative to a country's quota in the IMF. Interestingly, for the full sample, the results indicate that countries which faced a banking crisis in 1995 or 1996 (EIU 0 definition; see section IV), have subsequently enacted more liberal commitments. However, also countries with a booming bank sector (positive asset growth, high real M2 money growth) have assumed more liberal commitments; therefore, one cannot state unambiguously that countries most vulnerable to financial instability saw the need to engage in market openings and in greater commitments. A high population base is associated with more liberal commitments, as well as with a bias towards commercial presence (see the PC2, full sample results). As in Table 6 and 7, the evolution of political rights between 1993 and 1997 seems to be positively associated with a higher level of liberalization, for the group of large countries. More restrictive banking policies had a negative impact on the level of commitments for the large countries group. As a region, Latin America had uniformly lower levels of liberalization commitments, while the opposite holds for the OECD, in line with results from section II.
PC2 is explained very well, given the R 2 of 0.78 and 0.75, and the estimates indicate that countries with a weak banking system (low reserves-to-assets ratio or a decrease in bank deposits), a low GDP, a low savings ratio and/or major limitations on capital flows and FDI have weaker commitments under mode 3 (commercial presence) than under mode 1 (cross-border). High real money growth and high inflation tend to be associated with a modal bias towards mode 1 (especially for the full sample results; the left part of the table). As a group, large tropical countries and large countries in Middle East and North Africa seem to have a bias towards cross-border supply. Finally, the results for PC3 indicate that this variable is less well explained by the given set of variables, given the R 2 of 0.29 and 0.11. For the full sample, PC3, expressing a bias towards stronger insurance sector commitments (negatively measured), seems associated with a more open economy and with a lower asset base of deposit money banks. Countries that have seen their civil liberties increase, seem to prefer stronger banking sector commitments relative to insurance services commitments.
To sum up, differences in the choice of financial services liberalization commitments are determined by a number of macroeconomic and institutional factors, of which GDP growth, the growth and performance of the banking sector, and peer group effects are the main explanatory variables. There is also a clear link with actual policy choices and there are noticeable differences between large and small countries.
IV. FINANCIAL SECTOR COMMITMENTS AND FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY
There is a vast literature on the causes of banking and currency crises and on the construction of early warning indicators: see IMF (1999 IMF ( , 2000 and Goldstein et al. (2000) for recent overviews. This section investigates whether financial sector commitments of the Fifth Protocol are statistically and significantly associated with currency and banking crises over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] and whether the impact is positive. The definition of Frankel and Rose (1996) is adopted to identify currency crises: a crisis is said to occur if the exchange rate depreciation is more than 25 percent per year and is at least 10 percent higher than that of the previous year. In addition, crises that occur within three years of each other are counted only once, to avoid double counting. As a robustness check, the definition is applied to a country's exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the SDR. For banking crises, two sets of crisis dates have been retained. The first set is based on an inspection of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country reports' section on banking. The second set draws on Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) . Appendix V and VI contain a list of the exchange rate and banking crises for the broader period 1995-1999. Before analyzing the data econometrically, the raw numbers are examined to obtain an idea of the association between the level of commitments and financial stability. Table 9 gives an overview of the commitments scores in crisis and non-crisis countries, and Figure 4 shows the number of crises in low and high-commitments countries. Frankel and Rose (1996) and applied to USD and SDR exchange rates. CK refers to Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) , from which a narrow and a broad list of countries subject to a bank crisis can be identified. EIU refers to a dating of banking crisis by inspection of the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. Both types of financial instabilities list crises that took place in the years 1997-1999. See Appendix V and VI for the list of countries subject to a financial crisis. Insur.=insurance services, Secur.= securities services commitments. Source: author's calculations.
The numbers in Table 9 suggest that in countries which faced a financial crisis, commitments were on average 5 to 10 basis points higher/more liberal -with the exception of insurance commitments for currency crisis. A similar pattern holds for PC1. PC2 is negative in crisis countries and positive in non-crisis countries, suggesting that financial crises occurred most in countries that were most lenient to mode-1 commitments, and the difference is largest for currency crises. For banking crises, according to the CK-narrow definition, the opposite is true, suggesting that banking problems occurred in countries that had more liberal commitments under mode 3 than under mode 1. Finally, PC3 is positive for countries that faced a currency crisis, and negative for countries that were unaffected. As for banking crisis, the opposite holds if based on the EIU-numbers (the CK-numbers yield conflicting evidence): this would imply that countries that were affected, had more liberal insurance/more restrictive banking services commitments. Low and high-commitments countries were identified as their commitments measure was below or above the median value of the all-average score, respectively. The number of crises follow from the definition of currency/banking crisis, as explained in Table 9 and Appendix V and VI. Source: Author's calculations. Figure 4 shows the number of crises for low-versus high-commitments countries. As can be seen, when commitments are high, there appear to be twice as many crises compared to the situation when commitments are low, a conclusion that seems robust with respect to the definition of the crises (except for the EIU-broad definition of banking crisis, the difference is less pronounced: 24 versus 18). This seems to indicate that, if there is any impact of the WTO commitments on financial stability, it will be negative: higher commitments will be associated with a larger probability of crisis. To see whether this result holds, the issue will be investigated econometrically, using a variant of the extreme bound tests typically found in the economic growth literature (see Sala-i-Martin, 1997).
The idea is to estimate probit equations of the following general form:
where subscript i refers to country i, P[ . ] is the probability of a financial crisis in country i; Φ( . ) is the cumulative normal distribution function; X is a set of base variables, which, according to the empirical literature, are robustly related with financial crises; COM is the commitment variable under investigation; and Z is a varying set of up to K additional explanatory variables that may be associated with the incidence of a crisis; ε is an error term; α and γ are coefficient vectors; β is the coefficient for the commitments variable. A positive coefficient means that a higher value of the variable increases the probability of a crisis.
For the current application, combinations of 3 out of 60 variables were included in Z, which yielded a total of 34,220 equations per commitment variable; see Appendix IV for a complete description of the 60 variables. These variables have been chosen from the early warning indicators research and from previous studies on financial crises. For a part, they coincide with the set of indicators used in the specification search for the determination of the level of commitments. The fact that the list of variables is not uniform across the models is due to the different set of explanatory variables in the X vector and to convergence problems (multicollinearity). The X vector was constructed parsimoniously, after some experimenting with the data, and differs slightly in function of the equation to be estimated, as presented in Table 10 . The estimations were performed over the full sample and over the sample excluding small economies, as in section III. 
Notes
USD and SDR: currency crisis models; EIU 0 and EIU 1 : bank crisis models using EIU narrow and broad classification, respectively; CK 0 and CK 1 : bank crisis models using Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) identification of crisis. a : variable is included in full sample estimations, b : included for the sample of big economies only.
Each estimation with a specific commitments variable and a given Z i -vector yields a coefficient β zi , and a corresponding standard deviation σ zi . Then the lower extreme bound is defined as β zi −2 σ zi , for the lowest β zi , and the upper extreme bound is defined as β zi +2 σ zi , for the highest β zi . The extreme bounds test for the specific commitments variable says that if the lower extreme bound is negative and the upper extreme bound is positive (or vice versa), then this commitment is not robust (see Sala-i-Martin, 1997, p.3-4) . Using this criterion, there are hardly any commitments that are robust across all definitions of financial crisis, similar to the "nothing is robust" conclusion from the empirical growth literature.
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The complete distribution of the z-statistics are reported graphically for the various commitments indicators (the simple scores and the first three principal components), both for the whole sample and the large countries sample. Figures 5-20 and 21-36 present z-statistics of SDR and USD currency crisis, respectively, and Figures 37-52 and 53-68 show the distribution of z-statistics for EIU 0 and CK 0 banking crisis, respectively. In Appendix, additional results are reported for commitments under EIU 1 and CK 1 banking crisis definitions. In total, the graphs contain as much as 3.3 million probit estimates. Another 6.2 million estimates have been run on the specific sector commitments for each of the three modes of supply separately but these are not reported here. distribution of the t-statistics: if there is a large probability mass around or beyond the critical value, one could consider this variable as robust.
For currency crisis, the evidence seems to indicate that most of the financial services commitments have no robust impact on the probability of a crisis and the simple version of the extreme bounds test would be violated in (almost) all cases. As a whole, Figures 5 to 36 seem to indicate that more liberal commitments increased to some extent the probability of a currency crisis, both for the SDR and USD exchange rates, given the prevalence of positive z-statistics, although the majority is not significant at the 5 percent level (z = 1.96); taking a 10 percent critical value (z = 1.65), a larger proportion is significant. Most interestingly, for USD currency crises, the PC2-commitments seem to be very robust with a large probability mass of z-statistics at -2 and below. This suggests that countries with a modal bias in their commitments and which had stronger commitments with respect to commercial presence (mode 3) than with respect to cross-border supply (mode 1), had a robustly lower chance of being hit by a currency crisis vis-à-vis the USD, consistent with the evidence in Table 9 . This may be rationalized by the fact that commercial presence results in less distorted and less volatile capital flows and more stable financial sectors than cross-border trade. As argued by Kono and Schuknecht (2000) , commitments to mode 3 liberalization only require the liberalization of capital inflows related to commercial presence, whereas mode 1 requires liberalization of both inflows and outflows. A greater importance of cross-border trade also tends to be associated with a bias towards short term lending, which increases the volatility of capital flows and hence increases the risk of a currency crisis. As for banking crises, there are more cases in which the extreme bounds test would be passed, as an inspection of the figures 37-68 learns that the z-statistics generally are all at the positive side. In all, the evidence suggests that more liberal commitments also increased the probability of a banking crisis, and robustly so for the insurance services commitments (for both the EIU 0 samples and CK 1 large countries sample). For the EIU 0 definition of banking problems, also the PC3 seems robustly negative for the large countries sample, signaling the fact that countries with stronger insurance services commitments compared to other financial services, had a higher risk of being hit by a banking crisis. Alternatively, if commitments were less liberal in banking and securities than in insurance, countries had a smaller risk of banking crisis, consistent with the numbers in Table 9 . This also holds for the broader EIU 1 definition of banking problems (for the sample of large countries), as can be seen from the figure 85 in Appendix. For the CK 0 definition of banking crisis, a higher PC2 seems robustly associated with banking crisis. Hence, if countries had a modal bias in their commitments and allowed for more liberal commitments towards commercial presence than towards cross-border supply, they had an increased probability of domestic banking problems. This could stem from the fact that commercial presence of foreign financial institutions negatively affects the health of the domestic institutions, as noted in section II (the claim that older domestic banks are less efficient and lose their franchise value causing a 'gamble for resurrection' strategy), as these foreign competitors engage in "cherry-picking" of the most profitable activities of local financial service providers. However, in the long run, commercial presence may be beneficial through the introduction of new services and deepening of the market, enhanced access to foreign savings, the generation of local employment, the transfer of skills and technology and through learning effects by domestic institutions Schuknecht, 2000, and Aizenman, 2002) .
To sum up, most evidence indicates that the WTO commitments on financial services, as given in the Fifth Protocol, did not contribute very strongly or robustly to financial vulnerability, although the results tend slightly to favor the view that higher liberalization and more openness may be associated with a higher risk of financial instability. The latter would be consistent with the earlier evidence about the effect of financial liberalization on financial fragility, see, e.g., Aizenman (2002 ), Weller (2001 , Demergic-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) .
The findings in this paper could stem from the fact that an open economic system is inherently more prone to international spillovers and contagion effects compared with a closed system, although an open economic system is commonly believed to be superior in terms of resource allocation and should be able to mitigate the possible short-term adverse effects of liberalization. Along these lines, the negative short-term impact effect may operate only at the early stages of liberalization and for a limited period of time; hence, as more experience of managing a liberalized system is accumulated, the negative impact may be supplanted by the positive and superior effects of financial liberalization/development on economic growth (see Aizenman, 2002 for a description of this trade off and for proposals to prevent such crises, notably, adequate safeguard and prudential supervision/sequencing measures are required). Alternatively, the findings could simply reflect the fact that the commitments merely codified the mid-1990 status quo, as mentioned at the end of section II, and did not reflect any effective liberalization. Hence, the finding of increased vulnerability may suggest that the then-existing regulatory framework and pace of liberalization of financial services was not adequately tailored to the overarching need to preserve financial sector stability, and could be improved through a more thoughtful and prudent negotiation process, which is evolving in the WTO now (see also Kireyev (2002) and Hoekman (2002) ).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined several aspects related to financial services liberalization commitments in the framework of the WTO services trade negotiations. The aim has been to detect empirical regularities, which could be used in future theoretical work. From a theoretical point, commitments may be worthwhile since they allow economic agents to benefit from greater certainty and stability. These WTO commitments could also act as a signal of actual financial and banking policies, and hence indirectly be associated with financial sector vulnerability. Commitments measures were constructed for a broad range of financial services. In line with previous literature, the OECD and countries in East Asia and Eastern Europe are found to have more liberal commitments, whereas Latin American and South Asian countries have lower average commitments. Subsequently, it was investigated whether there were any variables that explained a country's choice of commitments levels. Several macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth, inflation and openness, banking performance, size and institutional variables were found to have some explanatory power. Countries with a higher economic growth, a negative growth in the banking sector and with restrictive actual policies were found to have lower liberalization commitments, sustaining an argument of protectionism and a signaling effect of actual policies. There are also clear 'peer group' effects, in the sense that countries from the same region or income group opt for a similar level of commitments. Finally, the contribution of these commitments to the occurrence of financial instability was examined. Casual evidence indicated that a larger number of crises occurred in high-commitments countries. This claim was checked by using a variant of extreme bounds tests. Econometric evidence indicates that the commitments indicators did not have a strong statistical impact on financial crises, although there were signs that the more liberal the commitments, the more likely financial stability was threatened, in line with earlier evidence on the effects of financial liberalization on financial fragility. If the commitments favored commercial presence (mode 3) over cross-border supply (mode 1) of financial services, this would tend to increase the likelihood of banking problems, but reduce the risk of a currency crisis. The former was explained by the negative and possibly short run effects of greater international competition on domestic financial institutions and the latter was motivated by the need for more comprehensive liberalization of capital flows under mode 1, which could give rise to an increased risk of volatile and destabilizing capital outflows. Finally, the evidence suggested that countries have been successful in preventing banking crises if they had more restrictive banking services commitments.
A few practical lessons follow from the above analysis: First, there is still a wide dispersion between countries and regions in terms of their commitments, and particularly mode 1 and securities and insurance services are least liberalized. This indicates that further financial services negotiations can be expected to take place, possibly within a framework of broader trade liberalization negotiations. However, the success of these negotiations will depend on the evolution of the underlying macroeconomic variables, banking sector performance, actual policies and the political economy, as revealed in this study.
Second, it should be acknowledged that commitments make sense only if they are properly sequenced and only if an adequate financial supervision and/or regulatory framework is in place. Although the current commitments may not constitute a major reason for concern about currency or banking crises, countries must be aware of the implications of a possible bias in their commitments and the risk of allowing more liberalization under mode 3 and in banking and securities services (as opposed to insurance).
Third, towards the explanation of the general finding (more liberal commitments imply a slightly larger risk of financial crisis), further research is needed. Two possibilities were offered, one was that this finding demonstrates a short lived effect, which would gradually disappear as more experience with the management of liberalized commitments is gained, adequate safeguard measures are taken and a prudential sequencing of liberalization is being set up. The other was that the analyzed commitments merely reflected the status quo policies of the mid-1990s, instead of real liberalization of financial services, and that these policies were not conducive to financial stability during the time period of the mid-1990s with highly volatile financial markets. Instead, it may be argued that the commitments should be improved through a process of considerate and prudent multilateral negotiations evolving now at the WTO.
Finally, it should be stressed that these WTO financial services schedules provide a powerful commitment device and a useful tool to assess the transparency and the development of regulatory policy in the financial sector. Given the widely held view that financial development stimulates economic growth (Levine, 2001) , countries should be aware of their (indirect) importance. Notes This table reports countries' scores on financial services liberalization commitments as specified in 
Discussion of the commitments principal component analysis
The PCA reveals 7 eigenvalues are larger than 1, the critical value which is typically used for analyzing the significance of factors in PCA (Kim and Müller, 1978) . For sake of completeness, also eigenvalues 8 to 10 are displayed although their contribution is not fundamental and their interpretation is rather difficult. As can be seen from the Table, the first component explains about 40% of the variation in the commitments' correlation matrix. The second and third component each add about 10% towards the explanation of correlations. Components 4 to 7 each explain between 3 and 6% of the variation of commitments. The remaining components each add less than 3%, which can be deemed marginal or negligible (from 11 onward, even less than 1.5%).
From the factor loadings, one can infer the meaning of the underlying factors. Doing so, the following interpretation of the factors is proposed for the first six principal components, for which the meaning can reasonably be established.
-Factor 1 -Overall level of liberalization commitments
All factor loadings are positive and reflect the importance of each of the commitments in the overall score of financial services market access regulation.
-Factor 2: Modal bias of commitments toward supply under modes 2 and 3
Factor loadings are overwhelmingly positive for mode 2 and 3 commitments, while most of mode 1 commitments have negative coefficients.
-Factor 3: (Negative) Bias of commitments toward insurance services
Loadings of insurance services are all negative, while other services have mainly positive coefficients.
-Factor 4: Modal bias of commitments toward supply under mode 2
Factor loadings are all positive for mode 2 commitments, while most mode 1 and all mode 3 commitments have negative coefficients.
-Factor 5: Narrow bank-insurance commitments bias
This factor is positively associated with commitments in core banking and insurance services: lending, deposit taking, life and non-life insurance. Other services have alternating signs and magnitudes differ across modes of supply.
-Factor 6: Core banking and auxiliary insurance services commitments factor A factor that loads positively mainly on core banking (lending, deposit taking, payment and settlement services) and on supplementary insurance services (intermediation and reinsurance Frankel and Rose (1996) : depreciation of 25% or more, 10% higher than the year before, and excluding crashes which occurred within 3 years of each other (to avoid counting the same crash twice). Source: International Financial Statistics, line rb and ae (official, market or principal exchange rate; national currency per SDR and USD, respectively), own calculations: percentages are December(t)/December(t-1) depreciation rates ranked from high to low. 
